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TIMBS V. INDIANA: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
WHEN USED BY STATES 
KRIS FERNANDEZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil forfeiture, the seizure of property associated with the 
commission of a crime, has long been used as a tool by Congress.1 In 
theory, forfeiture should help deter crime and dismantle criminal 
organizations by attacking their financial assets. However, some 
criticize the seizure of valuable assets from those who have not 
committed serious crimes.2 In Timbs v. Indiana, Petitioner Tyson 
Timbs asks the Supreme Court to incorporate the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the states, providing extra 
protection for individuals against fines and forfeiture that are “grossly 
disproportionate” to the harm caused.3 The decision to incorporate 
the Excessive Fines Clause and the guidelines for applying that 
incorporation would have a substantial effect on governments, which 
often rely on the revenue gained from forfeiture. 
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court of the United 
States should incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause based on 
historical support of an individual’s right to be free from excessive 
fines. Further, the Supreme Court should reaffirm its guidelines as 
described in Bajakajian, which weigh the harm caused, the maximum 
fines that could be levied against the defendant, and whether or not 
the defendant is meant to be targeted by the statute.4 These guidelines 
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 1.  Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993). 
 2.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioners at 15–16, 
Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Sept. 11, 2018). 
 3.  Brief for Petitioners at 7, Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Sept. 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
Brief for Petitioner]. 
 4.  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998). 
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sufficiently protect individual rights but do not encroach on the 
established societal expectation regarding property seizure. The 
Supreme Court should remand the case back to the Indiana Supreme 
Court with instructions to apply the Excessive Fines Clause in a way 
that best weighs the Bajakajian factors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
In January 2013, Petitioner used his father’s life insurance 
proceeds to purchase a Land Rover for $42,058.38.5 Petitioner 
regularly drove the Land Rover to transport heroin, and after several 
controlled purchases by the police, Petitioner was apprehended.6 In 
June 2013, Respondent Indiana charged Petitioner with two counts of 
dealing in a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to 
commit theft.7 In 2015, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of 
dealing in a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy to 
commit theft, in order to get the remaining charge dismissed.8 
Petitioner was sentenced to six years, and he paid $1,203 in various 
fines.9 
Within two months after the criminal charges were filed, 
Respondent also sought to acquire possession of Petitioner’s Land 
Rover.10 The trial court held that requiring him to forfeit property of 
such a high value is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of the . . . 
offense” and would therefore violate the excessive fines portion of the 
Eighth Amendment.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed.12 However, the 
Indiana Supreme Court reversed, noting that the particular clause had 
not yet been incorporated against the states by the United States 
Supreme Court.13 The Indiana Supreme Court took a “cautious 
approach” and avoided the federal question altogether.14 Because the 
incorporation question was not decided, Indiana relied on its own 
 
 5.  State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 1183–84.  
 14.  Id. 
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constitution, which does not protect against excessive fines.15 As a 
result, Respondent was entitled to take possession of the Land 
Rover.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.17 
B. Legal Background 
1. History of Incorporation 
The outcome in Timbs will rely on cases that establish the process 
for incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights against the states. The 
Bill of Rights imposes limitations and obligations on government 
action, but precedent dictates that the Court will decide on a case-by-
case basis which clauses can be used to challenge state action.18 
Until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill of Rights 
could be used only to challenge federal action.19 In Barron v. 
Baltimore, a plaintiff brought a claim against the state of Maryland 
based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.20 The Court 
held, however, that the “amendments contain no expression indicating 
an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot 
so apply them.”21 The Framers of the Bill of Rights had intended state 
governments to be conducted in accordance with their own state 
constitutions, and the Bill of Rights did not indicate any intention to 
breach that separation.22 
After the American Civil War, the United States dramatically 
shifted its stance on incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights 
against states.23 In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
large part to protect the individual rights of recently freed Black 
Americans.24 To bolster that goal, the amendment reads in relevant 
part: 
 
 15.  Id. at 1184–85.  
 16.  Id. at 1185. 
 17.  Timbs v. Indiana, 84 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. 2017), cert, granted, 86 USLW 3625 (U.S. June 
18, 2018) (No. 17-1091). 
 18.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010). 
 19.  Barron v. Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 775 (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982)). 
 24.  Id. 
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“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”25 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
substantially different from the provisions of the Fifth Amendment.26 
Specifically, it adds that a state cannot infringe on an individual’s 
rights without due process, indicating that constitutional protections 
are not limited to challenges against federal action.27 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court laid out a process of “selective 
incorporation” for determining which rights are protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.28 These rights have been demarcated in a 
variety of ways, but Duncan states that they are “fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions.”29 The Court recognized that the Bill of 
Rights enumerates many of these fundamental principles, so courts 
ought to look at the early amendments as guidance for what might 
qualify.30 The Court should look at each clause individually, 
determining if it is “essential to ‘a fair and enlightened system of 
justice’” and is therefore protected under the Due Process Clause.31 
The most recent incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
provides a full description of clauses on which the Court has ruled.32 
While the majority have been incorporated, some did not pass 
muster.33 Until Malloy v. Hogan, the Court had incorporated 
“watered-down” versions of the Bill of Rights clauses, holding states 
to a lower standard than their federal counterparts.34 However, the 
Court in Malloy was presented with the question of whether the Fifth 
 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26.  U.S. CONST. amend. V § 1 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”) 
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 28.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–162 (1968) (holding that the right to a trial 
by jury was incorporated against the states). 
 29.  Id. at 178 (quoting Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). 
 30.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010) (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963)) (“. . . the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular 
rights contained in the first eight Amendments.”).  
 31.  Id. at 760. 
 32.  Id. at 764–66 (citing a complete list of cases in which the Supreme Court has decided 
issues of selective incorporation). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964). 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination gave the same 
substantive rights against states as it did against the federal 
government.35 The Court found it unreasonable that individuals would 
have different fundamental rights in front of state judges than they 
would before federal judges.36 It held that the guaranteed rights are to 
be congruent.37 
2. History of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
As applied to federal action, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
that the Eighth Amendment mandates that fines should be reasonably 
proportional to a defendant’s conduct.38 Further, in Austin v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that forfeiture of property can be a 
violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.39 The clause is triggered only 
when the defendant is “punished.”40 Austin held that forfeiture is 
sufficiently damaging to qualify as punishment when any part of the 
motivation behind the forfeiture is to deter or to punish.41 The 
forfeiture must be entirely remedial for it to escape scrutiny under the 
Eighth Amendment.42 
Assuming that a given fine or forfeiture is considered punishment, 
United States v. Bajakajian created a test for determining if the 
punishment is excessive such that it violates the Eighth Amendment.43 
In Bajakajian, the defendant was charged with failing to report that he 
was leaving the country with more than $10,000, a statutory 
requirement.44 He pled guilty, but in the forfeiture bench trial, the 
district court ruled that he was to forfeit the $357,144 he had 
attempted to carry out of the country because that money was used in 
the commission of a federal crime.45 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993). 
 39.  Id. at 622.  
 40.  See id. at 610 (defining punishment as “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely 
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive 
or deterrent purposes”). 
 41.  Id. at 621. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998). 
 44.  Id. at 325. 
 45.  Id. at 325–26. 
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The Supreme Court held that this forfeiture violated the 
Excessive Fines Clause.46 It weighed (1) whether the defendant fit 
into the “class of persons for whom the statute was principally 
designed,” (2) the maximum penalties that could have been imposed 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, and (3) the harm caused by the 
defendant.47 In its application of the facts at bar to this test, the Court 
found first that the law was designed to catch money launderers and 
tax evaders, not forgetful people like the defendant.48 Second, the 
Court found that the maximum monetary penalty was 1/70th of the 
forfeiture.49 Finally, the Court found that the only harm caused by the 
defendant was the failure to inform the government that $357,144 was 
leaving the country.50 The Court held that the culpability and the harm 
were not enough to justify the full forfeiture and therefore the 
amount was “grossly disproportionate” to the wrong committed.51 
II. HOLDING 
The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected Petitioner’s argument that 
the Excessive Fines Clause should be incorporated against the states.52 
It deferred to the opinion in McDonald, in which the United States 
Supreme Court chose not to identify the clause as previously 
incorporated.53 The Supreme Court of Indiana chose a more cautious 
approach, inviting the United States Supreme Court to rule on the 
case while strictly applying Indiana law.54 Because Indiana law has no 
constitutional protections against excessive fines that could be used in 
Petitioner’s favor, the Court of Appeals’ affirming judgment was 
reversed.55 
 
 46.  Id. at 343. 
 47.  Id. at 337–39.  
 48.  Id. at 338. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 338–39. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2017). 
 53.  Id. at 1183. 
 54.  See id. (holding that the Indiana Supreme Court will “await guidance” from the 
Supreme Court). 
 55.  Id. at 1184–85. 
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III. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Argument 
Petitioner argues that “almost all other rights would become 
utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable 
power over the private fortune of every citizen.”56 This caution forms 
the bedrock of Petitioner’s claim.57 Petitioner maintains that Anglo-
American history is littered with evidence, up to the present, that 
people have the right to be free from fines grossly disproportionate to 
the gravity of their offenses.58 
Petitioner argues that the Excessive Fines Clause stems from a 
long history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, making it “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” prior to the ratification 
of the Eighth Amendment.59 The idea of a proportionality test for 
fines goes back as far as the Magna Carta, which states that a “Free-
man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the 
fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his 
contenement.”60 Fearing abuses from future kings, four hundred years 
later, Parliament gave more specific direction regarding excessive 
fines.61 Specifically, it sought to prevent kings from using unreasonable 
fines to increase revenue at the cost of citizens.62 Against this 
backdrop, the English Bill of Rights provided that “excessive Baile 
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and 
unusuall Punishments inflicted. . .”63 
The general principle of the English Bill of Rights was carried 
forward to American jurisprudence.64 The language of the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted directly from the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, which was adopted directly from the English Bill of Rights.65 
Petitioner argues that the repeated prohibition on excessive fines 
 
 56.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 2. 
 57.  See id. at 8. (“The power to fine is—and has always been—a formidable one. And 
unlike every other form of punishment, fines and forfeitures are a source of revenue for the 
government, making them uniquely prone to abuse. The accompanying risk to life, liberty, and 
property is very real.”). 
 58.  Id. at 10. 
 59.  Id. at 8 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)). 
 60.  Id. at 11. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 12. 
 63.  Id. at 16. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 17. 
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shows that the right is deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.66 Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Excessive Fines 
Clause was intended to be incorporated against the states.67 
Further, Petitioner argues that the right to be free from excessive 
fines was a staple of American jurisprudence when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.68 The Fourteenth Amendment was in large 
part a response to “Black Codes,” which included efforts to subjugate 
newly freed slaves with economic burdens.69 For example, without a 
special license, people who taught or preached to people of color were 
subject to heavy fines.70 Instead of heavy fines, people could “opt” to 
labor on public roads or receive physical punishment.71 Further, in 
Mississippi, Black Americans who were convicted of certain crimes 
but were unable to pay the fines were “leased” to any person who 
could pay the fine in their stead.72 The debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment made clear that many senators believed that these fines 
were grossly unfair.73 One senator noted that a $1,000 fine for 
trespassing would functionally condemn a Black American to a 
lifetime of slavery.74 The draconian fines instituted by many states 
were a particular target of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Petitioner believes that this indicates an intent to 
incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause against the states.75 
Petitioner maintains that other states joined with the federal 
government in prohibiting excessive fines under their own state 
constitutions.76 When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, thirty-
five of the thirty-seven state constitutions had adopted language 
directly from the Excessive Fines Clause.77 The remaining two states 
adopted some form of the proportionality test, functionally 
prohibiting the same type of government behavior.78 Petitioner argues 
that because this principle was universal across the states before the 
 
 66.  Id. at 18. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 19. 
 69.  Id. at 22. 
 70.  Id. at 20.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 23. 
 75.  Id. at 24. 
 76.  Id. at 24–25. 
 77.  Id. at 24. 
 78.  Id.at 24–25. 
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment must have intended the Excessive Fines Clause to be 
incorporated against the states.79 
Further, Petitioner argues that the right enshrined in the Excessive 
Fines Clause is just as imperative today as it was in the 1800s.80 When 
the government has unlimited power to levy fines, it can create and 
has created systems of perpetual punishment for minor crimes.81 Some 
states have “auto-jail” policies for people who are unable to pay their 
fines in a certain amount of time.82 Jailtime can result in job loss, an 
increase of debt, and other long-term consequences for those who are 
only responsible for minor harm.83 Forfeitures can have similar 
consequences.84 For those who have taken out loans to purchase a car 
or a house, the forfeiture of that property could be financially 
devastating.”85 Petitioner argues that power over people’s property 
could have “grave consequences” for personal liberty.86 
Finally, Petitioner maintains that this power is “uniquely prone to 
abuse.”87 When property is forfeited to the government, the proceeds 
from that property generally go to the agency conducting the 
seizure.88 Police departments, for example, depend on the revenue 
from the forfeitures, even setting goals for how much money 
departments should acquire from forfeiture.89 Petitioner argues that 
individuals need to be protected from abuse in the event that the 
survival of government agencies wholly relies on seizing property.90 
B. Respondent’s Argument 
Respondent argues that the question presented should be 
construed narrowly, and that the proportionality test of the Excessive 
Fines Clause should not apply to states exercising their power to seize 
property in in rem proceedings.91 Respondent draws upon a wide 
 
 79.  Id. at 25. 
 80.  Id. at 26. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 27. 
 83.  Id. at 26–27. 
 84.  Id. at 26. 
 85.  Id. at 25. 
 86.  Id. at 27. 
 87.  Id. at 28. 
 88.  Id. at 31. 
 89.  Id. at 33. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Brief for Respondent at 4–7, Timbs v. Indiana, No. 17-1091 (Oct. 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
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variety of historical evidence, concluding that a seizure of property 
does not constitute a “fine” as understood by the Eighth Amendment, 
and that forfeitures were never understood to be violations of 
fundamental American rights.92 
Respondent rejects Petitioner’s argument on the grounds that 
historical evidence against the use of in personam fines should not 
apply to questions regarding in rem forfeitures.93 Respondent 
concedes that historical documents such as the Magna Carta provide 
ample evidence that disproportionate monetary in personam penalties 
could be opposed to fundamental Anglo-American rights.94 
Nevertheless, there is a lengthy history of harsh in rem forfeitures that 
have gone unchallenged.95 English admiralty courts and the American 
colonies both utilized forfeitures to combat unlawful maritime 
practices, and the early United States continued this practice, under 
both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.96 
The general acceptance of in rem forfeitures can be demonstrated 
by the most draconian seizures by the federal government.97 For 
example, in United States v. The Louisa Barbara, the federal 
government enacted a strict weight-limit on maritime passengers.98 
The ship in question only exceeded the limit by a single passenger, but 
the court affirmed the federal government taking possession of the 
entire four hundred-ton vessel.99 In similar cases, courts argued that 
they had “no power” to go against the will of the legislature regarding 
the seizure of property.100 Respondent maintains that if such 
draconian outcomes like those in The Louisa Barbara went 
unchallenged under the Excessive Fines Clause, then surely the 
common understanding was that the clause did not apply to in rem 
forfeitures.101 
 
Brief for Respondent]. 
 92.  Id. at 5. 
 93.  Id. at 6–7. 
 94.  Id. at 45–46. 
 95.  Id. at 22.  
 96.  Id. at 18–19. 
 97.  Id. at 22. 
 98.  Id. at 23 (citing United States v. The Louisa Barbara, 26 F. Cas. 1000, 1001 (E.D. Pa. 
1833)). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Two Barrels of Whisky, 96 F. 479, 480 (4th Cir. 1899)). 
 101.  Id. 
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Respondent also argues that the “innocent owner rule” 
demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment right in question does not 
apply to in rem forfeitures.102 The innocent owner rule states that in in 
rem proceedings, the innocence of an owner cannot be used as a 
defense against the seizure of the property.103 So if a man lends his 
vehicle to a friend in good faith, ignorant of her plot to use the vehicle 
to transport drugs, his ignorance cannot be used to prevent the 
government from seizing his vehicle.104 The innocent owner rule, 
Respondent argues, demonstrates that the gravity of the owner’s 
crime is irrelevant to the forfeiture of the property.105 If the owner has 
done nothing wrong and his property can still be taken, then certainly 
it can be taken if he is actually responsible for a crime.106 Respondent 
notes that as early as 1844, the Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed the validity of the rule.107 In The Malik Adhel,108 Justice 
Marshall wrote that the necessity of the forfeiture is determined “. . . 
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the 
owner.”109 Respondent maintains that courts were well aware that the 
results of the innocent owner rule may seem unfair.110 However, the 
Supreme Court declared it to be “too firmly fixed in the punitive and 
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.”111 
Respondent notes that the Excessive Fines Clause has historically 
been ignored in state in rem forfeiture cases, which demonstrates that 
the common understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment was that it 
did not apply to the seizure of property. Today, every state has 
incorporated some form of the Excessive Fines Clause into their state 
constitutions.112 And yet it was not until House and Lot v. State113 in 
1920 that the Excessive Fines Clause’s application to in rem 
forfeitures was even discussed.114 In that case, the Alabama Supreme 
 
 102.  Id. at 23–24. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See id. at 24 (quoting The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844)) (“. . . the thing to 
which the forfeiture attaches [is determined] without any reference whatsoever to the character 
or conduct of the owner.”).  
 105.  Id. at 26. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 24. 
 108.  43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844). 
 109.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 24. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 27. 
 113.  204 Ala. 108 (Ala. 1920). 
 114.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 28–29.  
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Court rejected the use of the proportionality test for the validity of 
the forfeiture.115 No state courts have disagreed with House and Lot’s 
analysis.116 
Further, no federal court even considered the possibility of the 
Excessive Fines Clause applying to in rem cases until 1988.117 While 
the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all rejected its application, the 
Second Circuit became the first to rule that in rem forfeitures were 
subject to the proportionality test in 1992.118 Respondent argues that 
this lack of discussion for two hundred years demonstrates that the 
Excessive Fines Clause was never intended to be used as a defense to 
in rem forfeiture. Had the general populace understood the clause to 
apply to in rem forfeitures, the harshness of forfeiture would have 
incentivized some litigants to use the clause as a defense.119 The 
absence of any discussion on this front shows that it was not meant to 
be applied to seizures of property.120 
Respondent’s analysis of the historical evidence seeks to show 
that the Excessive Fines Clause was not meant to be applied to in rem 
proceedings, and therefore it should not apply to Petitioner’s Land 
Rover.121 Therefore, Respondent ultimately argues that the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s ruling should be upheld. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Part discusses two questions: whether the Excessive Fines 
Clause should be incorporated against the states, and what should 
qualify as an excessive fine. Ultimately, this Part contends that the 
clause should be incorporated, but that the Court should allow lower 
courts to have broad discretion in determining which fines are 
classified as excessive. This approach would be consistent with federal 
precedent regarding forfeiture.122 
 
 115.  Id. at 28. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 29–30. 
 118.  Id. at 30–31. 
 119.  Id. at 27. 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 58. 
 122.  See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998) (holding that a forfeiture 
of $357,144 is unconstitutional when the defendant was not one of the class of persons intended 
to be targeted by the statute, the maximum penalty for the statutory violation was $10,000, and 
the harm caused was not substantial). 
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A. The Excessive Fines Clause Should Be Incorporated Because Its 
Support from Historical Practice Comports with Previous 
Incorporations. 
Petitioner’s historical argument successfully demonstrates that 
Anglo-American tradition has valued protection from excessive fines 
across time and jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
demarcating fundamental rights often begins with historical 
practice.123 Petitioner shows that the roots of the Excessive Fines 
Clause stem from documents which are representative of older 
Anglo-American tradition.124 Furthermore, Petitioner establishes that 
the right to be free from excessive fines was intentionally enshrined 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.125 
The Excessive Fines Clause has a place in tradition which looks 
very similar to that of previously-incorporated rights.126 In the past, 
clauses from the Bill of Rights have been successfully incorporated, 
but the historical support for these clauses as fundamental rights 
rested on much more tenuous ground than the Excessive Fines 
Clause. For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,127 the 
Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was a 
fundamental right to be incorporated against the states.128 In its 
judgment, the Court stated: “Prohibition against the wanton infliction 
of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The 
identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment.”129 That selection 
is the beginning and end of the Court’s discussion on the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause’s place in Anglo-American tradition.130 
Similarly, the Excessive Fines Clause was taken directly from the 
English Bill of Rights.131 Further, the Court has previously held that 
because the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is placed in the 
same list as the Excessive Fines Clause, they should occupy equal 
 
 123.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010). 
 124.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11. 
 125.  Id. at 11, 18, 19. 
 126.  561 U.S. at 765 n.13. McDonald held that the only rights not fully incorporated are “(1) 
the Third Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s 
grand jury indictment requirement; (3) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil 
cases; and (4) the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines.”  
 127.  329 U.S. 459 (1947).  
 128.  Id. at 463.  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 10. 
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standing as fundamental rights.132 Therefore, the Excessive Fines 
Clause more than passes the standard for incorporation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that even the Respondent fails to argue 
that the Excessive Fines Clause should not be incorporated in some 
fashion. To be sure, Respondent vigorously defends a narrow 
construction, maintaining that an “excessive fine” does not apply to in 
rem forfeitures.133 But the closest that Respondent comes to 
advocating for non-incorporation comes at the end of its brief, where 
it states that non-incorporation is the less attractive option compared 
to merely excluding in rem forfeitures from the clause.134 Moreover, 
both parties seem content that the Court incorporates the Excessive 
Fines Clause for in personam fines.135 
B. The Court Should Allow for Lower Courts to Have Broad 
Discretion in Interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause Because Its 
Historical Use and the Current Precedent Do Not Support an 
Overaggressive Application. 
Assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause will be incorporated, 
the question remains as to what qualifies as an excessive fine. 
Respondent’s historical evidence supports a more lenient 
interpretation, but the Petitioner advocates for a hard boundary based 
on historical evidence that protects a defendant’s livelihood against 
fines for a minor violation.136 The Eighth Amendment has already 
been applied at the federal level, and the results have not been overly 
restrictive of government action.137 The Court should establish clear 
guidelines that protect individuals according to the description of the 
clause outlined in the Magna Carta, while still allowing for civil 
forfeitures. The constitutionality test in United States v. Bajakajian 
provides an effective measure and should be used as the test for 
constitutionality.138 The test has been applied in lower court cases, and 
 
 132.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263 (1989) (holding that 
the Eighth Amendment as a whole limits government action, and therefore each clause in the 
amendment has equal reason to be incorporated against the states). 
 133.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 4. 
 134.  Id. at 44–45. 
 135.  Id.; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 8. 
 136.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at passim; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11. 
 137.  See United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that when (1) a 
defendant is one of the class of persons a law is intended to target, (2) the amount forfeited is 
more than four times the maximum monetary penalty for the statutory violation, and (3) 
Congress states that violating the statute causes severe harm, the forfeiture is constitutional). 
 138.  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998). 
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while the proportionality of the penalties do not stray far from the 
proportionality of historically-accepted in rem forfeitures, the 
decisions still ensure that individual rights are protected.139 
Understanding the contours of a fundamental right should begin 
with historical practice.140 In this respect, Respondent has shown a 
convincing pattern. Cases like The Louisa Barbara demonstrate that 
the American legal system has traditionally not been diametrically 
opposed to civil forfeitures.141 Indeed, the defendant never even raised 
the Eighth Amendment question.142 The innocent owner rule also 
works in Respondent’s favor, showing that in the past the defendant’s 
culpability has not affected the fairness of the forfeiture. Petitioner 
advocates for a rule that forbids fines that are not disproportionate to 
the defendant’s wrongdoing, yet civil forfeiture is societally accepted 
even when the property owner has done no wrong.143 Forfeitures of 
items of value, which may even seem unfair to the average person, 
likely do not infringe on the fundamental right. 
However, Petitioner establishes a tradition that provides a strict 
boundary on how much property the state can seize.144 The Magna 
Carta established that financial punishment must reserve to the 
defendant his livelihood, no matter how great the defendant’s fault. 
As applied to cases like Timbs, individuals have a fundamental right 
to protection from the government taking their livelihood.145 Possible 
circumstances that would trigger this protection could include the 
government seizing a car or a house when the defendant has just 
 
 139.  See United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that a forfeiture 
which would deprive a defendant of her livelihood would violate the Excessive Fines Clause); 
see also von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the civil 
forfeiture of a farm valued at $124,000 was constitutional, when the defendant knew her son was 
growing marijuana on the property and the maximum statutory penalties including $1 million 
and twenty imprisonment); United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the forfeiture of an equitable interest in a home worth under $100,000 was constitutional, 
when the defendant knowingly hired an undocumented immigrant and the maximum statutory 
fine of $250,000); United States v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
forfeiture of over $12,000,000 plus the defendant’s equity in his home was constitutional when 
the defendant failed to file Currency Transaction Reports as related to his check-cashing 
business, enabling clients to commit fraud). 
 140.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010). 
 141.  See id. at 23 (showing that draconian civil forfeitures by the federal government have 
historically not been challenged under the Excessive Fines Clause). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 4; Brief for Respondent, supra note 91 at 24. 
 144.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3 at 11. 
 145.  See id. (“. . . a Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of 
the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement.”). 
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taken out a heavy loan on that property. The consequences of the 
debt, along with potentially needing to pay for new transportation or 
shelter, could endanger the defendant’s livelihood. 
Taking these dual historical considerations together, the Supreme 
Court has already established a set of guidelines that reconciles the 
two values.146 The Court has held that Excessive Fines Clause analysis 
is to take into account (1) whether the defendant falls into the class of 
persons that the statute is designed to target; (2) the proportionality 
when comparing the statutory penalties and the forfeiture; and (3) the 
harm caused by the defendant.147 In Bajakajian, the Court found that 
because the defendant did not fall into the class of targeted persons, 
because the forfeiture was seventy times greater than the other 
penalties, and because the harm was minimal, the forfeiture was 
unconstitutional.148 This analysis takes into account the fairness of the 
penalty, which the Magna Carta requires. However, it still allows for 
steep penalties so long as other factors are satisfied, so the test does 
not run afoul of historical forfeitures like the ship in Louisa-Barbara. 
Since the decision in Bajakajian, lower courts have not hesitated 
to find that large forfeitures are constitutional using the Bajakajian 
test.149 After Bajakajian, the statutory penalties for failing to report 
the $10,000 had been amended, and the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals reached the opposite conclusion regarding the 
constitutionality of a similar forfeiture.150 In Jose, the defendant was 
also found to have left the country without declaring $10,000.151 
However, the Patriot Act had bolstered the original statute.152 The 
regulation now targeted anyone who had acquired money illegally, the 
maximum penalty was increased six-fold with added jail time, and 
Congress specified that the harm of not declaring money was 
severe.153 Given these statutory changes, the court used the Bajakajian 
test to determine that the defendant in Jose was required to forfeit all 
$114,948 that he did not declare.154 In contrast with Bajakajian, the 
forfeiture was proportionally much less in Jose.155 Further, Congress 
 
 146.  Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337–39 (1998).  
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  E.g., United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 110. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 111–12. 
 154.  Id. at 113–14. 
 155.  Id. at 112. 
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had clarified in the amended statute that a violation of the statute 
actually caused substantial harm.156 As shown in Jose, the federal test 
for excessive fines comports well with societal expectations regarding 
civil forfeiture as compared to the criminal responsibility of the 
defendant. Outcomes in other federal civil forfeiture cases have been 
similarly in line with historical practice.157 The harsh outcomes of 
these cases may be unsettling, but the decisions are not out of step 
with outcomes in cases like The Louisa Barbara. 
The guidelines in Bajakajian and Jose are sufficient to account for 
both the longstanding practice of civil forfeiture as presented by 
Respondent, and Petitioner’s historical evidence that Anglo-
American jurisprudence seeks to protect individuals from excessive 
fines. On Respondent’s side, the guidelines could reasonably lead to 
the same outcomes in cases like The Louisa Barbara, even though 
those outcomes might be considered draconian. On Petitioner’s side, 
the Excessive Fines Clause does apply to civil forfeitures and the 
protection is triggered in situations where the forfeiture is wildly 
disproportionate and the defendant has not caused substantial harm. 
Because Anglo-American jurisprudence has historically allowed civil 
forfeiture but has also somewhat limited the proportion of the 
forfeiture as compared to the harm caused, as seen in the Magna 
Carta and early federal cases, the historical evidence does not weigh 
decisively in favor of either Petitioner or Respondent. 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  E.g., United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the end, historical practice and Anglo-American tradition are 
somewhat at odds. However, several conclusions can be clearly drawn. 
British legal tradition paved the way to a fundamental American 
understanding that individuals should have some level of protection 
from excessive financial punishments. This level of protection 
includes, at the very least, the right to maintain one’s livelihood even 
after a financial punishment is assessed. However, historical practice 
also shows that heavy civil forfeitures were not understood to be 
challengeable under the Excessive Fines Clause in the time 
immediately following the Eighth Amendment’s ratification. Finally, 
the guidelines in Bajakajian and Jose provide precedent for a 
balancing test which has the effect of weighing the historical 
considerations from both sides. 
Given these conclusions, the Court should incorporate the Eighth 
Amendment because Anglo-American tradition demarcates a strict 
boundary for how much property can be seized through financial 
punishment. If the punishment threatens the defendant’s livelihood, it 
is unconstitutional. If the punishment falls short of threatening the 
defendant’s livelihood, the Court should instruct lower courts to 
follow its guidelines from Bajakajian and Jose. These guidelines will 
protect an established function of the government, while also ensuring 
that fines are not grossly disproportionate to the harm caused by the 
defendant. 
